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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recently published article, I examined the Legal Realism found in
Leon Green’s and Karl Llewellyn’s tort scholarship.1 Brian Leiter had
previously presented an insightful “philosophical reconstruction” of
Legal Realism.2 In articulating what he sees as the descriptive and
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1. Edmund Ursin, The Missing Normative Dimension in Brian Leiter’s
“Reconstructed” Legal Realism, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2012). It should be noted that,
in response to Francis Bohlen’s having labeled him a “legal realist” and then—in
Green’s view—having distorted his scholarship, Green wrote, “I subscribe to no label
. . . . I have never used the word ‘realism’ in my writings, and while I have no prejudice
against it, I do not know what it means.” Leon Green, Innocent Misrepresentation, 19
VA. L. REV. 242, 247 (1933). One wonders if Green had in mind Karl Llewellyn’s
recently published article, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431 (1930), when he wrote this.
2. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007); Brian Leiter, American
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normative aspects of Legal Realism, Leiter drew most of his examples
from the field of commercial law, which was the main focus of Llewellyn’s
scholarship. In this context he wrote that most Legal Realists made a
descriptive claim about judicial decisions or, more specifically, decisions
of appellate courts.3 Stated in its most succinct form, this descriptive
claim was that judicial decisions fall into discernible patterns, correlated
with the underlying factual scenarios of disputes (or “situation types”),
as opposed to formal legal rules.4 My examination of Green’s and
Llewellyn’s tort scholarship confirmed this thesis.
On the normative front, Leiter wrote that most Legal Realists, including
Llewellyn, were “quietists.”5 Some quietists believed that because an
irremediable fact about judging is that judges respond to fact situations,
it “makes no sense to give normative advice.”6 “A more subtle version
of quietism,” linked to Llewellyn, advised judges that they “ought to do
what it is that they largely do anyway.”7 Leiter wrote that the quietism
of the Legal Realists “contrasts markedly with the normative ambitions
of contemporary jurisprudents like Ronald Dworkin,” who want to
“reform [the] practice [of judges] in line with [their] theor[ies] of
adjudication.”8
My focus on the tort scholarship of Green and Llewellyn, however,
revealed an ambitious normative agenda. Under the umbrella of what is
now known as the theory of enterprise liability, these scholars urged
courts to rewrite tort law to reflect the values of twentieth-century
America by adopting expansive liability rules and eliminating barriers to
recovery that protected even negligent defendants from liability. This
made them, in Leiter’s terms, “non-quietistic.”9 Nonquietists believed
that “judges should simply adopt, openly, a legislative role, acknowledging

Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) [hereinafter Leiter,
American Legal Realism]; Brian Leiter, Classical Realism, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 244 (2001)
[hereinafter Leiter, Classical Realism]; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) [hereinafter
Leiter, Legal Realism]; Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997) [hereinafter Leiter, Rethinking Legal
Realism]; Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138 (1999)
[hereinafter Leiter, Positivism] (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
3. Leiter, Positivism, supra note 2, at 1148.
4. Id.
5. Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 276.
6. Id. at 277.
7. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58.
8. Leiter, Classical Realism, supra note 2, at 258.
9. Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 277–78.
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that . . . courts . . . make judgments on matters of social and economic
policy.”10
Thus, contrary to what one would expect from reading Leiter, in their
tort scholarship Green and Llewellyn resemble Dworkin, precisely
because they wanted to reform the practice of judges in line with their
normative theories of adjudication. In fact, Green laid out the policy
framework that the California Supreme Court, beginning in the 1960s,
would write into law as it adopted expansive liability rules and limited or
10. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58. Green and Llewellyn
also pursued their policy goals with legislative agendas. Green urged legislatures to
adopt no-fault compensation plans modeled after workers’ compensation plans. See
Ursin, supra note 1, at 10. For his part, Llewellyn sought to incorporate the doctrine of
strict products liability in a proposal that would become the Uniform Commercial Code.
See id. at 26.
Leiter uses Felix S. Cohen’s article, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935), as an example of nonquietism. See Leiter,
American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58–59; Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at
277. That article criticized the conceptual approach that the New York Court of Appeals
had taken in answering the question of whether a corporation incorporated in one state
could be sued in the courts of another state. Instead of asking, “Where is a corporation?”
the court, in Cohen’s view, should have acted in the manner that a competent legislature
would act. Cohen, supra, at 810. It should have made a “factual inquiry into the practice of
modern corporations in choosing their sovereigns and into the actual significance of the
relationship between the corporation and the state of its incorporation.” Id. Then,
[i]t might have considered the difficulties that injured plaintiffs may encounter
if they have to bring suit against corporate defendants in the state of
incorporation. It might have balanced, against such difficulties, the possible
hardship to corporations of having to defend actions in many states,
considering the legal facilities available to corporate defendants.
Id. At that point, “[o]n the basis of the facts revealed by such an inquiry, and on the
basis of certain [economic, sociological,] political or ethical value judgments as to the
propriety of putting financial burdens upon corporations,” the New York Court of
Appeals might “have attempted to formulate some rule as to when a foreign corporation
should be subject to suit.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
The resemblance to Green’s approach is striking. In place of traditional conceptual
analysis based on “fault,” Green offered his own scheme for determining both common
law duties and whether legislative compensation plans should displace traditional tort
law in particular categories of accidents (or situation types). See Leon Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases (pt. 2), 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 255–57 (1929). He urged
courts to focus on five factors: (1) the administrative factor—the practical workability of
a rule; (2) the moral factor—or considerations of fault; (3) the economic factor—
including the impact on economic activity; (4) the prophylactic factor—concerned with
the prevention of future harm; and (5) the justice factor. Id. at 255. The latter factor
was, at the time, seen as “synonymous [with] the capacity to bear the loss.” Calvert
Magruder, Book Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 412, 415 (1931). Based on these factors,
Green suggested that courts might adopt a rule holding that industrial landowners owe a
full duty of care to adult trespassers, and perhaps to all persons, on their property.
Green, supra, at 275.
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eliminated defenses and no-duty rules that protected even negligent
defendants from liability.11 Similarly, the policy-driven doctrine of strict
products liability, a key component of the enterprise liability theory, can
be traced to Llewellyn’s famous 1930 casebook on the law of sales.12
One might ask at this point: Which was Llewellyn? The quietist
depicted by Leiter? Or the nonquietist that I found? The answer is that
he was both. And there is nothing anomalous about this. This Essay
explains why this is so. But in doing so, it reveals that quietism and
nonquietism are an unfortunate choice of terms—and that it is a mistake
to divide Legal Realists into quietist and nonquietist camps. My previous
article used these terms because, in the context of that article, they
proved adequate. In other contexts, however, they are less adequate—
and, indeed, can be misleading.
II. NONQUIETISM, LEGAL PRAGMATISM, AND “ACTIVISM”
The simplest explanation for why it is not anomalous to characterize
Llewellyn both as a quietist and a nonquietist is that a Legal Realist
might be a quietist in one substantive area of law (commercial disputes)
and a nonquietist in another (such as tort law)—a point consistent with
Leiter’s passing reference to the fact that different substantive areas of
law may call for different types of Legal Realist analysis.13 But there is
more to it than this. Nonquietism is not the opposite of quietism.
Nonquietism, Leiter explains, reflects the view that “judges should
simply adopt, openly, a legislative role, acknowledging that . . . courts . . .
make judgments on matters of social and economic policy.”14 A Legal
Realist who held this nonquietist view (judges have a legislative role)
might conclude that, as a matter of social and economic policy, courts in
commercial disputes should enforce the norms of commercial culture. If
courts were already routinely doing this, this Legal Realist might reach
the conclusion that it makes no sense to give normative advice. But this

11. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567–68 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing
traditional landowner rules). See generally VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN,
UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 30–37, 71–87 (1995); Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges
Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF.
L. REV. 1267, 1335–38 (2009).
12. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 341–42
(1930); see NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 11, at 8.
13. See Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 314 (contrasting Legal
Realist analysis of commercial law and constitutional law).
14. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58.
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fits the definition of a quietist (it makes no sense to give normative
advice).15
What this reveals is that, contrary to what one might infer,
nonquietism is not the opposite of quietism. Nonquietism is a view of
the lawmaking role of judges (judges are legislators—they make law).
Quietism reflects a conclusion (it makes no sense to give normative
advice) in an area of law in which, for example, courts routinely are
deciding cases in the manner that the Legal Realist thinks is correct (for
example, enforcing commercial norms).16 Thus, there is nothing anomalous
about the previously discussed jurisprudential nonquietist (courts make
law based on policy) reaching a quietist conclusion (it makes no sense to
give normative advice). This analysis clarifies why a Legal Realist
might be a quietist in one substantive area of law (as Leiter reports
Llewellyn was with respect to commercial disputes) and a nonquietist in
another (which, we have seen, Llewellyn was in the area of products
liability).17
At best the use of these terms is apt to lead to confusion. But this
confusion is needless because a better, more familiar term exists for this
view of the judicial role. Leiter’s nonquietist, who believed that courts
have a legislative as well as adjudicatory role—and that policy plays a
role in their lawmaking—is the equivalent of Judge Posner’s legal
pragmatist who also believes that at times “judges in our system are

15. Of course, the reasoning of the quietist is different from that of the nonquietist.
The quietist believed that it was an “irremediable fact about judging” that “judges
respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts.” Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at
276–77. Because of this, “[i]t makes no sense to give normative advice.” Id. at 277.
The nonquietist believed that “judges should simply adopt, openly, a legislative role,
acknowledging that . . . courts . . . make judgments on matters of social and economic
policy.” Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58. As just discussed, if
courts were already responding in the manner dictated by policy considerations, the
nonquietist might reach the (quietist) conclusion that it makes no sense to give normative
advice.
16. Thus, Leiter writes that “[i]t is quite clear . . . that quietists like Llewellyn
thought it was good that judges were inclined in commercial disputes to try to enforce
the norms of commercial culture.” Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 59.
17. Not all courts were imposing strict liability in food products cases. These
courts, Llewellyn wrote, were “hampered in their vision.” LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at
342. Some of these courts no doubt were formalistic or Langdellian in their mode of
decision and thus not responsive to the stimulus of facts. But others, consistent with the
core claim, may have been responsive to the situation type. These courts may simply
have approached products liability cases from an ideological starting point or policy
perspective at odds with that of Llewellyn and the courts that imposed strict liability.
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legislators as well as adjudicators”18 and that policy judgments are at the
core of judicial lawmaking.19 Leiter has, in fact, recognized as much in
noting that we could call the nonquietist Legal Realists “‘ProtoPosnerians,’ to mark their anticipation of a view familiar in our own
day.”20
The jurisprudence of Green and Llewellyn certainly can be described as
pragmatic. And Fowler Harper, a contemporary of Green and Llewellyn,
made precisely this point in a brief 1929 article surveying developments
in both the constitutional and common law realms.21 Harper captured an
important aspect of the Legal Realists’ quest to find solutions, through
social and economic legislation or judicial lawmaking, to the problem of
accidental injury brought on by the maturation of American industry.22
And he gave it the name “juristic pragmatism,”23 a term that
foreshadowed Judge Posner’s later use of the term “legal pragmatism.”24
Building on themes developed by Holmes and Green, Harper wrote,
“[a]s law for Justice Holmes means prophecies of what the court will do;
so, just law for the pragmatist jurist means prophecies of what will
produce the most satisfactory and most desired consequences.”25 And
this law could be produced by legislatures or courts. Thus, Harper
wrote, judicial decisions that even in the midst of the Lochner era “made
possible the great flood of social legislation . . . , completely revolutionizing
the legal conception of ‘due process of law,’ proceed from a deep-rooted
pragmatist thinking.”26 For example, “[s]tatutes alleviating conditions of
employment . . . have higher working values than decisions which emanated
from natural law but left the laborer ‘free to starve.’”27
Similarly, “[t]he common law . . . affords constant evidences of the
juristic pragmatism which alone can solve its philosophic problems.”28
Leon Green’s tort scholarship provided Harper with his common law
example.29 In examining conflicting case law on the effect of the
violation of a statute, Green had written that “[t]he question was one of
sound policy and the Wisconsin court took one view while the Vermont

18. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 118 (2008).
19. Id. at 13, 238.
20. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58.
21. See Fowler Vincent Harper, Some Implications of Juristic Pragmatism, 39
INT’L J. ETHICS 269, 273–74 (1929).
22. See id. at 285–86.
23. Id. at 285.
24. POSNER, supra note 18, at 13.
25. Harper, supra note 21, at 273–74.
26. Id. at 285.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 286.
29. See id. at 286–87.
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court took the other.”30 As to which was right, Green observed that “[i]t
is a matter of judgment, good taste, an interpretation of the community’s
desires; in short, law making.”31 Harper wrote that “when jurists talk of
judicial decision, not in terms of a logically determined system . . . but in
terms of ‘judgment,’ ‘good taste,’ and ‘interpretation of the community’s
desire,’ they are talking in terms of working hypotheses, offensive to any
form of natural law.”32 For Harper this type of analysis was “juristic
pragmatism.”33 So why not pick up on the terminology of Posner and
Harper and describe Legal Realists like Green and Llewellyn as legal
pragmatists, thus eliminating the confusion caused by calling them
nonquietists?
Moving beyond this clarification, two observations are worth making,
one obvious and one not. First the obvious: Legal Realists opposed legal
formalism. The descriptive claim of formalists was that “judges respond
primarily—indeed, perhaps exclusively—to . . . applicable rules of law
and modes of legal reasoning.”34 The normative view was that “judges
ought to be primarily rule- and legal-reason-responsive.”35 The Legal
Realist view, in contrast, was that “in deciding cases, judges respond
primarily to the stimulus of the facts of the case, rather than to legal
rules and reasons.”36 Regarding the lawmaking role of courts, Legal
Realists such as Green and Llewellyn believed that courts are lawmakers;
they exercise a legislative as well as an adjudicative function, and policy
plays a role in their lawmaking. The formalist, in contrast, believed that
courts do not make law—and that policy has no role in judicial
decisionmaking.
Less obvious is the fact that a nonquietist is not necessarily an
“activist.” At the time that the Legal Realists wrote, the United States
Supreme Court was considered an activist court because decisions such
as Lochner v. New York had overturned social and economic legislation.37

30. Id. at 286 (quoting Leon Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate
Cause, 6 N.C. L. REV. 3, 15 (1927)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 286–87.
33. Id. at 287.
34. Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 277–78.
35. Id. at 278 n.54. A Legal Realist, such as Green, might concede that Judge
Posner is correct in his statement that many judicial decisions, though not the most
important ones, are responsive to legal rules. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 8.
36. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 52.
37. See 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Repelled by the perceived abuses of the Lochner era, Legal Realists
called for judicial restraint and a respect for the separation of powers.38
But in calling for courts to change the way they were deciding cases—by
adopting a nonactivist posture—these Legal Realists would be characterized
as nonquietist. They were giving normative advice. And this nonquietist
call for judicial restraint followed in the path forged by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, whom Posner identifies as a legal pragmatist.39
III. THE EXAMPLE OF HOLMES’S THE PATH OF THE LAW
Leiter cites Holmes’s famous 1897 essay, The Path of the Law,40 as an
example of normative quietism.41 He notes that Holmes complained in
The Path of the Law that judges had “failed adequately to recognize their
Leiter
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”42
acknowledges that this statement might be seen to situate Holmes as a
nonquietist.43 But, Leiter continues, Holmes thought that this weighing
of considerations of social advantage was “really going on . . . anyway.”44
Despite what judges said, Holmes wrote, there was “a concealed, halfconscious battle on the question of legislative policy.”45 This was, in
fact, “inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion
to deal with such considerations [was] simply to leave the very ground
and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious.”46
Holmes emerges, according to Leiter, as a quietist. What “Holmes really
call[ed] for is for judges to do explicitly (and perhaps more successfully,
as a consequence) what they do unconsciously anyway.”47 Thus
“[n]ormative theory . . . takes a back seat to the practical task of making

38. See Leon Green, Unpacking the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1937, at 67–
68; Karl Llewellyn, A United Front on the Court, NATION, Mar. 13, 1937, at 288.
39. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 57 (2003).
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
41. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58 (citing Holmes, supra note
40, at 467).
42. Holmes, supra note 40, at 467; see Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note
2, at 58.
43. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 59. In his early writing on
Legal Realism, Leiter unequivocally cited Holmes’s The Path of the Law as an example
of quietism. See Leiter, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 277. More recently, however,
using the same analysis, he characterizes Holmes as a “Proto-Posnerian,” that is, a
Realist who adopted a “weaker version of quietism—tell judges that they ought to do
what they by-and-large do anyway.” Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at
58.
44. Id. at 59.
45. Id. (quoting Holmes, supra note 40, at 467).
46. Id. (quoting Holmes, supra note 40, at 467).
47. Id.

494

[VOL. 49: 487, 2012]

Legal Realism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

a systematic, empirical study of the real grounds of decision. We need
to explain and describe judicial decision-making, rather than tell judges
what they ‘ought’ to do.”48
However, if Holmes is read in the context of the substantive law he
was discussing, a more complex picture emerges.49 In The Path of the
Law, Holmes addressed judicial decisionmaking in both the common
law and constitutional law.50 With respect to the former, Holmes
examined the application of (pre-workers’ compensation) tort law to the
problem of the soaring accident toll of the industrial age in the context of
employees injured in the workplace.51 He first argued, as he had in The
Common Law, that behind its form and logic the common law reflects
judicial accommodation of “competing legislative grounds.”52 Accordingly,
“the means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time,
and . . . the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a
given body in a given time and place.”53 Thus, as social conditions and
values change, the judge must reconsider the common law. Indeed,
Holmes argued that “[w]e do not realize how large a part of our law is
open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public
mind.”54
Turning specifically to the common law of worker injuries, Holmes
noted that judges instruct juries “that an employer is not liable to an
employee for an injury received in the course of his employment unless
he is negligent.”55 Despite this instruction, juries “generally find for the
plaintiff if the case is allowed to go to them.”56 Holmes asked why this
discrepancy existed. His answer was that the common law was out of
touch with popular perceptions of sound policy: “[T]he traditional policy
of our law is to confine liability to cases where a prudent man might
have foreseen the injury, or at least the danger.”57 In contrast, “the
48. Leiter, Classical Realism, supra note 2, at 257.
49. For an earlier discussion of this more complex picture, see Ursin, supra note
11, at 1291–94, and Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 229 (1981).
50. See Holmes, supra note 40.
51. Id. at 466–67.
52. Id. at 466; accord OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35 (Little,
Brown, & Co. 1881).
53. Holmes, supra note 40, at 466.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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inclination of a very large part of the community is to make certain
classes of persons insure the safety of those with whom they deal.”58
The explanation for this shift in policy preferences lies in the successful
industrialization of America during the nineteenth century. In Holmes’s
view, traditional tort doctrine originated in preindustrial America—in
“the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and
the like, where the damages might be taken to lie where they fell by
legal judgment.”59 In contrast, the torts of industrialized America “with
which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of certain
well known businesses. They are injuries to person or property by
railroads, factories, and the like.”60 With respect to these torts, the liability
“is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public.
The public really pays the damages.”61 Accordingly, “the question of
liability, if pressed far enough, is really the question how far it is desirable
that the public should insure the safety of those whose work it uses.”62
Holmes thought that courts could answer this question, and this answer
could lead to a rewriting of the traditional tort law of employer liability.
Holmes wrote that “even now our theory upon this matter [namely, the
imposition of accident costs on employers] is open to reconsideration,

58. Id.
59. Id. at 467.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. In The Common Law, Holmes had considered the alternatives of strict
liability and social insurance. He wrote, “The state might conceivably make itself a
mutual insurance company against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens’
mishaps among all its members. There might be a pension for paralytics, and state aid
for those who suffered in person or estate from tempest or wild beasts.” HOLMES, supra
note 52, at 116. Alternatively, “it might throw all loss upon the actor irrespective of
fault.” Id. Holmes rejected these alternatives as unsound:
The state does none of these things, however, and the prevailing view is that its
cumbrous and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion unless some
clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo. State interference
is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good.
Id. In his view, “Universal insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply
accomplished by private enterprise.” Id. He also rejected the proposal to “redistribute
losses simply on the ground that they resulted from the defendant’s act.” Id.
[Such an] undertaking . . . would not only be open to [the above] objections,
but . . . to the still graver one of offending the sense of justice. Unless my act
is of a nature to threaten others, unless under the circumstances a prudent man
would have foreseen the possibility of harm, it is no more justifiable to make
me indemnify my neighbor against the consequences, than to make me do the
same thing if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me to insure him
against lightning.
Id. As we have seen, however, popular attitudes changed over the next decades and
these considerations of justice were no longer as compelling.
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although I am not prepared to say how I should decide if a reconsideration
were proposed.”63
Holmes was not urging judges to adopt a strict liability rule, but
asking them to consider adopting such a rule and to consider the policy
question of “how far it is desirable that the public should insure the
safety of those whose work it uses.”64 He was addressing the process of
judicial decisionmaking and lawmaking. And his normative advice
made him a nonquietist—and a legal pragmatist. He was urging judges
to “adopt, openly, a legislative role, acknowledging that . . . courts . . .
make judgments on matters of social and economic policy,”65 to act in a
manner analogous to a “competent legislature.”66 If Holmes had himself
addressed the substantive issue of what liability rule courts should adopt,
he might have reached the quietist conclusion that sound policy dictated
that the status quo be retained—and thus there was no need, and it would
make no sense, to give normative advice. 67 As we know, American
legislatures, not the courts, would decide that the status quo was
unacceptable, as they moved to adopt workers’ compensation plans in
coming decades.
Holmes’s recognition of the need for courts to reconsider traditional
tort law and policy is linked to the demand in his dissent in Lochner that
courts not interfere with legislative attempts to cope with modern social
and economic conditions and values.68 For Holmes, it would not be
anomalous to call for judicial restraint in Lochner while arguing for the
63. Holmes, supra note 40, at 467; see Ursin, supra note 49, at 273–74 (discussing
Holmes’s recognition of the need for courts to reconsider traditional tort law and policy);
see also Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1267 (1997) (recognizing that Holmes was suggesting that the law
of torts might need to be wholly rethought).
64. Holmes, supra note 40, at 467.
65. Leiter, American Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 58.
66. Cohen, supra note 10, at 810.
67. This apparently was the case in Holmes’s own tort decisions. See, e.g., Balt. &
Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69–70 (1927) (finding that the driver of a truck
struck while crossing a railroad was barred from recovery as a matter of law when the
driver did not get out of his vehicle when he could not otherwise be sure a train was not
dangerously near); United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275–76 (1921)
(holding that a child cannot recover when harmed by a poisonous pool of water when he
was not induced to trespass by the pool but discovered it after he had come on the land).
Judge Posner has written that “Holmes decided . . . tort cases . . . in accordance with the
individualistic, anti-collectivist—one might even say anti-socialist—philosophy that
came naturally to him.” Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59
IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1983).
68. See Ursin, supra note 49, at 274.
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permissibility of judicial reform of the common law.69 Courts and
legislatures both have a responsibility to bring the law in tune with the
“felt necessities of the time.”70 Moreover, as Holmes pointed out in The
Path of the Law, courts that were unwilling to consider reform of the
common law also were likely to succumb to the constitutional intervention
characteristic of the Lochner era.71
In The Path of the Law, Holmes clearly foresaw the coming dominance
of Lochner-style jurisprudence, writing that “people who no longer hope
to control the legislatures [now] . . . look to the courts as expounders of
the Constitutions.”72 Moreover, “in some courts new principles have
been discovered outside the bodies of those [constitutions], which may be
generalized into acceptance of the economic doctrines which prevailed
about fifty years ago, and a wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of
lawyers does not think about right.”73 That, of course, is what Holmes
would accuse the Lochner Court of doing a decade later, when he would
write that the Court’s overturning of New York’s maximum hours law
for bakers was based “upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain.”74 Holmes felt it necessary to remind the
majority that the “Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spenser’s Social Statics.”75 In Holmes’s view, deference to legislative
judgments in the realm of social and economic policy was called for;
his—or the Court’s—agreement or disagreement with a particular
economic theory “has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law.”76
Holmes’s The Path of the Law criticism of the judges of this era was
that they had “failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing
considerations of social advantage.”77 In Holmes’s view this “duty is
69. See Posner, supra note 67, at 18 (recognizing that, for Holmes, “considerations
of judicial self-restraint [usually] were irrelevant . . . when a judge is expounding private
judge-made law as distinct from public law”). Holmes did not make a sharp distinction
between judicial and legislative lawmaking. For example, in writing about judicial
lawmaking, he often spoke of theories of “legislation” or “legislative policy.” See, e.g.,
HOLMES, supra note 52, at 35; Holmes, supra note 40, at 466–67; Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing C.C. LANGDELL,
A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879), and SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON,
PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT (1879)).
70. HOLMES, supra note 52, at 1.
71. Holmes, supra note 40, at 467–68.
72. Id. Holmes noted that a fear of socialism both infected “the comfortable
classes of the community” and, he suspected, “influenced judicial action both here and in
England,” though not necessarily consciously. Id. at 467.
73. Id. at 468.
74. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Holmes, supra note 40, at 467.
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inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal
with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation
of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious.”78 Holmes’s hope was
that if lawyers could be made “habitually to consider more definitely and
explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be
justified, they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident,
and see that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often
burning questions.”79
Holmes is very much the nonquietist. He is advising courts to “weigh[]
considerations of social advantage.”80 Or, more precisely, to see that
considerations of social advantage are at issue in their constitutional
rulings. He is telling judges how they ought to decide cases—in this
case to adopt a posture of judicial restraint, to “hesitate where now they
are confident, and see that really they [are] taking sides upon debatable
and often burning questions.”81 Holmes’s position demonstrates, of course,
that nonquietism and activism are not synonymous. In the constitutional
arena Holmes is a nonquietist, urging courts to do what they were not
doing—to adopt a position of judicial restraint in the review of social
and economic legislation.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468.
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